Strategic report · Issue 2 · November 2026
Poland: War, Hybrid Pressure and the Resilience of Supply

Ukraine, the Baltic states, energy, food, water, infrastructure and scenarios for the next month.
The second issue of my monthly strategic report. The edition of 17 November 2026 covers 18 October – 16 November 2026, with a 90-day background from 19 August. 17 November is not included in the balances because the day was incomplete.
The report separates three kinds of content: events, statements by the parties and my own scenarios. Where no comparable data series exists, it shows n.a. instead of an estimate presented as a measurement.
Key findings
Operational risk, not evidence of an imminent war with NATO
Regional air incidents and a foiled act of sabotage have been documented. At the same time, on 16 November the Ukrainian General Staff did not report signs of Russian offensive groupings forming on the Volyn and Polissia axes. This is a premise for monitoring, not a guarantee of Poland’s security.
The air war remains intense, but not every measure of it is rising
According to KAS, Russia launched 6,310 long-range drones in October, against 6,322 in September, with declared neutralisation rising from 83% to 85%. In the first week of November, however, OSW pointed to significant under-reporting in the official overnight reports.
The Baltic is giving concrete warnings
In Latvia, separate drone episodes on 1 and 3 November received different assessments of origin, and on 14 November eight people were detained over a foiled attempt to sabotage Threod Systems in Estonia. These events should not be merged into a single confirmed operation.
No simple “more strikes = more expensive fuel” relationship
Brent crude fell by 15.86%, from 109.86 to 92.44 USD per barrel (last session before the window against 16 November), despite the renewed campaign against Russian refineries.
Gas has a buffer, but the system’s full resilience has not been measured
The latest available stock is 35.3257 TWh against a capacity of 36.85 TWh, about 95.86% full. This is not a measure of how many days the country can supply itself.
Core limitation. No current, comparable series were obtained for Polish retail and wholesale prices of fuel, energy and food, nor complete daily operator flows. The report is a risk analysis with a partly incomplete price module, not a complete market balance.
In this issue
- Method and reliability: how information is classified
- A. Ukraine: front line, air war and long-range strikes
- B. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, including GNSS interference
- C. Energy and fuels: readings, price gaps, technical capacity vs actual supply
- D. Food and water
- E. Infrastructure and logistics
- F. Escalation, Belarus and service assessments, the Suwałki Gap
- G. Events vs prices and risk
- Scenarios for the next month: low, base and high cases
- Comparison with the 18 October edition
- Monitoring until the next edition: indicators and warning thresholds
- The gaps that matter most
- Bibliography: 41 source addresses
Final conclusion
The most useful picture of risk for Poland comes from combining confirmed downtime or damage, an actual loss of supply and a recurring pattern of incidents. The volume of alarming posts, the annual capacity of infrastructure or the percentage of the adversary’s declared losses are not, on their own, enough to forecast shortages and prices.
Download and series
- Edition
- 17 November 2026
- Main window
- 18 October – 16 November 2026
- 90-day background
- 19 August – 16 November 2026
- Length
- 40 A4 pages
- Languages
- English and Polish
- Series
- Strategic report, issue 2. A new issue every month
Download the report (PDF) 40 pages · 2.0 MB · English